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Many studies have examined the determinants of ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic 
developing countries and report a myriad of contributory factors. It is natural to observe 
many correlates because ethnic wars tend to gain their own momentum and proceed for 
variety of reasons that are not directly related to the initial causes. Some intervention is 
necessary to end an ethnic war. The objective of this exercise is to draw attention to 
conditions necessary to sustain ethnic peace. Good governance and high and shared 
growth often top the list of conditions necessary to achieve ethnic peace. How to get good 
governance to developing countries is the key question of interest. To long for an 
enlightened leader to emerge and set every thing right is utopian. In this exercise we 
argue that openness to foreign trade and investment is a more assured condition to 
achieve good governance and high growth. Openness acts as a disciplining force on 
governments regardless of whether they are democratic or authoritarian. A theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence are presented to support the hypothesis.  
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Like sparks that remain buried under a pile of ash, ethnic tension is a dormant spark that 
awaits fuelling in multi-ethnic societies. It is all too well known how ethnic conflicts
1, 
once ignited, engulf and destroy peaceful lives, scar ethnic relationships over many 
generations and become hard to contain without mammoth efforts. There is a growing 
literature that focuses on the determinants of ethnic conflicts and wars. The objective of 
our exercise, however, is to draw attention to examining the conditions necessary to 
sustain ethnic peace. This is important because when ethnic peace breaks down and 
escalates into an ethnic war, the war may gain its own momentum and continue for 
reasons unrelated to the initial causes of the conflict. Even if such a war comes to an end 
through some interventions, there is no guarantee that lasting ethnic peace will emerge if 
the necessary conditions for peace are absent.   
 
This exercise was motivated by the experience of Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Both countries 
are democracies, have practiced ethnic preference policies
2 and experienced racial riots. 
Although Sri Lanka’s ethnic preference policies were relatively mild and Sri Lanka had a 
head-start in terms of socio-economic development, Sri Lanka failed to sustain ethnic 
peace and got embroiled in a crippling separatist war that came to surface in 1983. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, has so far managed ethnic peace successfully. In fact, any 
one predicting the ethnic future of the two countries would have predicted a more 
                                                 
1  We use the term ethnic tension broadly to refer to ethno-linguistic-religious tension. Ethnic conflict refers 
to an armed conflict. 
2  Many countries, including developed ones, have put in place affirmative action plans to redress some 
disparities that were created by historical circumstances. If the outcome is not Pareto improving (i.e., make 
the targeted group better off without making other groups worse off) they become discriminatory.    3
turbulent ethnic climate for Malaysia than for Sri Lanka. A careful examination of the 
policies and performance of the two countries point in the direction that it was the open 
economy that helped Malaysia move forward despite the constant presence of ethnic 
tension in the country, and it was the import substitution (closed economy) policies that 
paved the way for the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Poverty and relative deprivation 
became a breeding ground for both ethnic and communist rebellions in Sri Lanka.
3 The 
experiences of the two countries prompt us to place openness to foreign trade and 
investment as one of the most assuring conditions, where possible, for ethnic peace in 
developing multi-ethnic countries because it ensures not only growth by promoting the 
private sector but it also acts as a disciplining force of on the government. This is the 
hypothesis that we set out to test in this exercise.  
 
The quality of governance needs some discussion at the outset. There is a large literature 
that blames governments for failures in the developing world, and discussions are abound 
why good governance is essential for development and ethnic peace. Although the policy 
makers are responsible for formulating and implementing good policies, there is no 
mechanism in closed economies to keep the policy makers under check. Even the most 
promising leaders in closed economies have failed to bring about the changes they 
desired because of over-powering bureaucracies. Obviously a determined leadership is 
required to make a change. The leaders who have succeeded in opening the economies 
have managed to create, perhaps slowly, more responsible bureaucracies. Once set in 
                                                 
3 Armed communist uprising in Sri Lanka occurred in 1971. This created a precedence for ethnic rebellion. 
Although Sri Lanka embarked on a private-sector driven open-economy policy in 1977 and repealed many 
discriminatory policies, it came too late for the country; the ethnic tension had already given way to the 
formation of rebellion groups.   4
motion, openness appears to generate a sustaining feedback loop between government 
policies and the country’s socio-economic environment that will bring about economic 
growth and ethnic peace. Policy makers in this setting are more likely to implement 
socio-economic policies that harness ethnic peace and share the growth dividends.
 4  (We 
follow up on this further in Section 3.)  
 
After a brief literature survey in Section 2, we will present a theoretical framework in 
Section 3 and provide regression results in Section 4 from panel estimation of a three-
equation model for growth, quality of governance and ethnic conflict as the endogenous 
variables. A results summary is provided in the concluding section. 
 
2. Recent Literature on Ethnic Conflicts  
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) provide a substantive summary of the literature on civil wars. 
They point out that the study of civil war is dominated by political scientists. 
Nevertheless, these studies in general have focused on three broad categories of 
determinants of ethnic conflicts (Collier et al. 2003). The studies that emphasize 
economic factors have focused on issues like poverty, economic inequalities and legacies 
of colonialism. The studies that emphasize political factors have focused on issues like 
the lack of democracy and opportunities for a peaceful resolution of political disputes. 
The studies that emphasize cultural factors have focused on issues like longstanding 
ethnic and religious animosities. As a background for our study, in the next three sub-
                                                 
4  Singapore is a classic example in this regard.  Although circumstances pushed Singapore to adopt open 
economy policies and the leadership deserves full credit for its quality of governance, we often forget the 
role that Singapore’s global dependence played in disciplining the country’s single-party government.  
China and India are two recent examples where openness is playing a highly disciplining role on the 
government and bureaucracies.    5
sections we highlight the findings of some recent studies, especially those which have 
attempted to provide some quantitative analyses. It should be noted that there is a 
substantial overlap in some of these studies with regard to the three types of factors.  
 
Economic Factors 
Many studies have looked into how growth is affected by civil conflicts and how civil 
conflicts depend on economic factors. As for the former type, the empirical growth 
literature has been growing at a rapid rate and some of these studies have examined how 
conflicts affect growth. Barro and Lee (1994) estimate an endogenous growth model that 
includes either the occurrence or the duration of a civil war as an additional explanatory 
variable. They found that the occurrence of civil war has a negative but statistically 
insignificant effect on the growth rate and the duration of the war has a positive but 
statistically insignificant effect on growth. Sala-I-Martin (1997) on the other hand found 
a statistically significant negative effect of the incidence of war on growth. Using an 
augmented neoclassical growth model Mankiw et al. (1992) found that the incidence of a 
civil war has a moderately negative impact on per capita income and substantially 
negative impact on the growth rates of per capita income in the neighboring countries. 
They further found that the greater the intensity of the civil conflict, the greater the 
spatial spillover effects. Easterly and Levine (1997) found that ethnically diverse 
societies have slower economic growth and more political instability than ethnically 
homogeneous societies.  
   6
As for how economic factors affect conflicts, we try to summarize the literature under 
some broad themes. A number of studies have emphasized that high growth and 
development reduce the incidence of civil conflicts (Boswell and Dixon (1990), Muller 
and Weeds (1990), Gurr (1994)). Fearon and Laitin (2000) argue that the determinants of 
insurgency are mainly economic, not political. They find that primordialism, nationalism, 
and cultural or civilizational cleavages have no explanatory power as determinants of 
either the magnitude or the prevalence of civil wars. They find economic growth, rather 
the lack of it, to be the most salient determinant of civil war prevalence. They also assert 
that a civil war will occur when its opportunity cost is low and that the lack of democracy 
and ethnic fragmentation are statistically insignificant correlates of civil conflicts.  
 
Evidence provided by Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001) shows that ethnic conflicts in 
Africa are mainly due to poor economic performance. They argue that, civil wars in 
Africa are fundamentally driven by lack of economic opportunities rather than by 
political or other grievances such as repression against particular social groups. Findlay 
(1996) observes that economic growth and effective governance have led to a decline in 
internal ethnic conflicts in Malaysia since the 1970s while poor economic growth, among 
other things, in the Philippines and Burma has allowed their internal conflicts to persist.  
 
Apart from economic growth, some have emphasized other economic factors such as 
inflation, unemployment, and natural resource dependence as contributory factors to 
ethnic conflicts. Gurr and Duvall (1973) argue that high inflation and unemployment 
levels induce uncertainty within different societal groups that will lead to ethnic tensions   7
and conflicts. Franzosi (1989) argues that political strikes vary directly with high levels 
of inflation and unemployment, although the relationship may be co-relational rather than 
causal. Balasuriya (1978), Silva (1997), Herath (2002), and Abeyratne (2004) have also 
emphasized unemployment as the major issue that affected inter-ethnic relations in Sri 
Lanka. Among those who have argued that developing countries which depend heavily 
on natural resources face a high risk of civil wars are  Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001), 
Berdal and Malone (2000), Fearon (2001), De Soysa (2002), Elbadawi and Sambanis 
(2002), Collier et al. 2003, and Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
 
Some researchers have looked into the relationship between openness and civil conflicts. 
Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that the foreign economic liberalization is welfare 
enhancing. Their cross-national comparison shows that developing countries that are 
economically open experience higher rates of economic growth and are more likely to 
avoid ethnic conflict than countries with closed economies. Bussmann and Schneider 
(2003) find that long-term trade openness reduces the likelihood of armed conflicts. 
According to them free trade has a conflict-reducing effect and that it can affect the 
preferences and norms of conflict regulations. Moreover, they did not find any evidence 




There are many studies that explain political factors as the main cause of ethnic conflicts 
in multi-ethnic countries. Elbawadi and Sambanis (2000) using a large cross-country   8
panel data set found that the relatively higher prevalence of war in Africa is attributable 
to high levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on 
natural resources. They argue that the best and fastest strategy to reduce the prevalence of 
civil war in Africa and prevent future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms. In 
subsequent papers, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) found that democracy is negatively 
associated with ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict is positively associated with ethnic 
fractionalization. Sambanis (2001) argues that identity wars are predominantly due to 
political grievance rather than lack of economic opportunity. Sambanis also found that 
living in a bad neighborhood with undemocratic neighbors or neighbors at war, 
significantly increases a country’s risk of experiencing a civil conflict. 
 
Henderson and Singer’s (2000) results of a logistic regression analyses corroborate 
previous findings that the semi-democracies are prone to high risk of civil wars. Their 
findings suggest that a multifaceted strategy of full democratization and economic 
development is required to reduce the likelihood of civil war in post colonial states. 
Similarly Hegre et al. (2001) found that middle-level democracies are more prone to civil 
war than high level democracies and high level autocracies. According to them, coherent 
democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate 
regimes are the most conflict prone. Reynal-Querol (2001) analyzed the role of political 
systems in preventing ethnic conflicts. She argues that the establishment of 
consociational democracies can prevent ethnic wars which originated from religious 
differences.    9
Cultural Factors 
Some of the researchers cited above have also incorporated socio-cultural factors into 
their investigations. Horowitz (1985) argued that the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and civil war is not monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous 
and highly heterogeneous societies and more conflicts in societies where a large ethnic 
minority faces an ethnic majority. Easterly and Levine (1997) argued that ethnic diversity 
has had a particularly negative impact on economic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Fearon and Laitin (2000), focusing on prevalence and conflict magnitude, found no 
evidence of a significant association between risk of civil war and the degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity.  
 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) using an index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation (ELF) found 
that more fragmented societies are not more prone to civil wars than the rest, but that the 
danger of civil war increases when society achieves mid level values of the index. They 
used the concept of ethnic fragmentation as a proxy for the coordination costs of a 
rebellion. The argument is that the greater the ethnic fragmentation the greater the 
coordination costs and the lower the risk of an onset of civil war. Their empirical analysis 
showed that ELF is actually not a significant determinant of the onset of civil war; 
whereas ethnic dominance significantly increases the risk of civil conflict. 
 
Ellingsen (2000) and Elbawadi and Sambanis (2000, 2002) have found that ethnically 
polarized societies have a higher risk of suffering a civil war than homogeneous 
societies. Elbawadi and Sambanis examined the impact of ethno-linguistic and religious   10
fractionalization on the probability of violent conflict. They found that the net effect of 
ELF on the incidence of civil war was an additive sum of its influence on the war onset 
and war duration. Ethnic fractionalization was positively, robustly, and non-
monotonically associated with the probability of war incidence. Reynal-Querol (2002) 
found that religious divisions are more important than language divisions and natural 
resources in explaining ethnic conflicts. 
 
 
3. Analytical Framework 
A game theoretic model that Gershenson and Grossman (2000) developed provides a 
useful starting point for our exercise. Using a contest-success function they presented a 
framework to examine whether an ethnic conflict between two groups ends or never ends. 
Instead of their formulation where each group is trying for political dominance we can re-
cast the model within a framework where the majority (MA) group is trying for political 
unity of the country while the minority (MI) group is trying for political independence. 
The set of possible outcomes that emerges from this exercise are summarized in Figure 1. 
In the figure, XMA is the value that the majority ethnic group attaches to retaining political 
unity of the country in the next period, XMI is the value that the minority ethnic group 
attaches to gaining political independence in the next period, and the nonnegative 
technological parameter θ measures the effectiveness of spending by the minority ethnic 
group in challenging the political option of the majority relative to the effectiveness of 
spending by the majority ethnic group in defending its political option.    11
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Figure 1: Ethnic peace or conflict 
 
 
Area A in Figure 1 represents ethnic peace with no conflict. This is achieved when 
(/) 2 MA MI XX θ ≥ , which requires XMA to be sufficiently large relative to XMI or θ to be 
sufficiently small. In this case the minority ethnic group agrees with the majority to stay 
in political unity. Area B represents ethnic conflict that ends whenever the minority group 
succeeds in gaining political independence. This happens if 
(/) 2 (/) MAM I M IM A XX XX θ <≤ . The first part of the inequality indicates that so long as 
the majority group holds on to keeping political unity, the conflict will continue because 
both the value that the minority group attaches to independence (XMI) and its relative 
technological effectiveness (θ) are large. The second part of the inequality indicates that 
the conflict ends when the majority agrees with the political-independence option of the   12
minority. Area C represents a never ending conflict. This happens if (/) 2 MA MI XX θ <   
and ( / ) 2 MI MA XX θ < , that is when XMA is neither too large nor too small relative to XMI 
and  1/2 θ > . In this case neither ethnic group accepts the political option of the other 
group.    
 
One problem with the Gershenson-Grossman model is that its implications cannot be 
tested directly because it centers on quantities that are difficult to measure.  The other 
difficulty is that its static framework does not entail the evolution of the quantities XMA 
and XMI  that may allow for the possibilities of moving from areas B or C to A  or from C 
to B (Figure 1).  To extend the model to the framework that we are interested in, we 
assume that XMA is a positive function of the economic well-being of the majority group 
and XMI is a negative function of the economic well-being of the minority group.  If both 
the majority and the minority are economically well-off then each group has too much to 
loose if a conflict arises and the desire to achieve ethnic peace increases. This means the 
condition for ethnic peace ( a high value of the ratio XMA/XMI)  can be sustained relatively 
easily.  
 
The economic well-being depends on economic growth and development of a country, 
which in turn depends on effective government policies. The biggest challenge many 
developing countries face is effective governance. As we have argued in the introductory 
section, an effective way to bring about effective governance is to keep the country open 
to foreign trade and investment and let the private sector thrive. The experience of a 
number of countries indicates that openness is very likely to bring about a disciplined   13
government regardless of whether it is democratic or authoritarian. Inter-linkages that 

















Note: EPP = ethnic preference policies 
 
 
Figure 2: Closed economy and ethnic conflict 
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Note: EPP = ethnic preference policies 
 
Figure 3: Open economy and ethnic peace 
 
 
In the two figures the dotted arrow at the top indicates that a closed economy or an open 
economy is a result of some policy decision of the government. The government provides 
the legal and institutional framework for closed or open economies. Although the 
government sits at the top, we do not consider its behavior to be an exogenous entity. As 
we have shown in the figures, the behavior of the government is endogenously 
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determined by what is happening in the economy. Stated in different terminology, the 
feedback links of the government’s policy reaction function depends on the type of 
economy in operation. In these figures there are three key endogenous variables that we 
are interested in, economic growth, quality of the governance, and ethnic peace or 
conflict.  
 
As for Figure 2, we do not have to re-iterate how closed developing economies in the 
world have failed miserably to generate sufficient growth to uplift the masses from abject 
poverty levels. These countries also have endured the presence of highly bureaucratic and 
corrupt governments regardless of whether they are democracies or authoritarian states.  
Poverty, relative deprivation and discontent especially in the presence of ethnic 
preference policies become the breeding ground for ethnic tension and conflicts.  
 
The virtuous feedback loop highlighted in Figure 3 shows how a private sector driven 
open economy acts as a disciplining force on the government. Initially a determined 
leadership is required to go against vested interests of the bureaucracy and lobby groups 
and to liberalize the economy and open it to foreign trade and investment. As the country 
gathers growth momentum the government becomes more and more responsive and will 
strive hard to provide a stable political environment for the proper functioning of the 
economy. This may include a whole plethora of measures that will uplift the living 
standards of the masses. It is also in the self interest of the government officials to pursue 
such policies because, unlike the closed-economy case, prosperity opens up avenues to 
enhance their own wealth accumulation through legal means. As the economic well being   16
improves across the ethnic groups, the opportunity cost of rebellious activities increases. 
Moreover, as the standard of living improves, the demand for democracy increases and 
the political institutions may become more and more democratic. This allows for 
increased political participation and, therefore, channeling grievances into non-
confrontational forums. Overall, the probability of sustaining ethnic peace is likely to 
increase substantially in an open economy. In other words, the value the minority group 
attaches to political independence is likely to decrease substantially, leading to a high 




4. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section we subject the above formulation to an empirical test by estimating a three 
equation model to assess how growth, quality of governance, and ethnic conflict respond 
to openness after controlling for some standard determinants. The three equations for a 
panel specification are: 
 
Openness and economic growth 
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Openness and quality of governance 
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Openness, quality of governance, economic growth and ethnic conflict 
 
01 2 1 3 4 1
22
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where, for quick reference, GROWTH = GDP growth rate (log first difference of GDP), 
OPEN = openness, QG = quality of governance, PCAP = physical capital, HCAP = 
human capital, POP = logarithm of population size, POPG = population growth (log first 
difference of POP), INF = inflation rate, DEMO = democracy, CONFLICT = ethnic 
conflict, ELF = ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Note that we use the lagged values of 
INF in all the equations and GROWTH in the second and third equations to avoid 
simultaneity problems. A detailed description of these variables, the expected sign of 
their coefficients and data sources are given below.  
 
We use two measures of openness to assess the robustness of the relationship that we 
focus on. One is the commonly used trade-GDP ratio, data taken from the Penn World 
Tables (PWT, Version 6.1) (Summers et al. 2002). The other is a more comprehensive 
measure called “composite trade openness index” developed by Gwartney et al., 2001). 
This index closely captures the legal and institutional framework of openness that we 
have defined as openness in our exercise. It is estimated from the following indicators: 
revenues from taxes on trade as a share of the trade sector, mean tariff rate, standard 
deviation of tariff rates, composite tariff rating, difference between the official and black 
market exchange rate, restrictions on capital transactions with foreigners, and actual size 
relative to the expected size of the trade sector. Each indicator is given a value from 0 to   18
10 and the index is set to range from 0 to 10; the larger the value the higher is the 
openness of a country. As we have argued earlier we expect a positive effect of OPEN on 
GROWTH and QG and a negative effect on CONFLICT.  
 
Economic growth is measured by the annual growth rate of per capita real GDP taken 
from the World Bank publication World Development Indicators (WDI). We use a 
corruption index (taken from the site countrydata.com) to proxy quality of governance 
(QG). This index ranges between 0 and 10 with zero indicating the most corrupt (lowest 
quality) and ten the most clean (highest quality) governments. As discussed earlier we 
expect QG to have a positive effect on GROWTH and a negative effect on ethnic 
CONFLICT. Following others we use investment/GDP ratio to proxy physical capital 
(PCAP), data taken from the WDI. In the absence of comparable data across countries, 
we use the adult literacy rate to proxy human capital (HCAP), data taken from the WDI. 
Despite its limitations, this is commonly used as a proxy for HCAP in developing 
countries where a large fraction of the population may lack basic education. In the 
GROWTH equation population growth (POPG) stands as a proxy for labor force growth. 
(The population data are also from the WDI.) The expected effect of PCAP, HCAP, and 
POPG on GROWTH is positive. In the QG equation the effect of population size (POP) 
on QG is somewhat ambiguous though in general we can expect developing countries 
with large POP to provide more opportunities for corruption. On the other hand, the 
larger the POP the more likely is the occurrence of an ethnic CONFLICT (Alesina et al., 
2003).  
   19
Many developing countries face high inflation rates and the eroding purchasing power of 
income is a common cause of grievance. Some studies have found INF to have a negative 
effect on GROWTH (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Grier and Tullock, 1989). On the 
other hand, these studies show that higher inflation rates increase the incidence of 
corruption (low QG). High and variable inflation is assumed to increase uncertainty about 
prices and therefore to increase the cost of auditing agents’ behavior, resulting in higher 
corruption (Braun and DiTella, 2000). Studies also have found high and variable inflation 
to fuel ethnic tension and CONFLICT (Rowlands, 2000). We use the annual inflation rate 
computed from the Consumer Price Index taken from the WDI. 
 
The indicator variable for democracy (DEMO) was taken from the widely-used Polity IV 
data set by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The Polity IV democracy measure uses a 20-
point integer scale constructed from two subscales: democracy and autocracy, each is 
given values in the range 0 and 10. Subtracting autocracy from democracy, as suggested 
by Polity IV’s authors, generates a summary measure that we call DEMO. This varies 
within the range from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). We added 10 to 
this measure to bring the minimum value to 0, in order to avoid complications in the 
construction of the squared term of DEMO.  Therefore, the score of DEMO extends from 
0 (most autocratic) to 20 (most democratic). Democracy is expected to enhance both 
sustained growth and the quality of governance (Rivera-Batiz and Francisco, 2002). In 
the case of ethnic conflicts there is evidence in support of a non-linear (typically an 
inverted U shape) relationship between ethnic conflicts and democracy. To capture this 
we include both DEMO and DEMO
2 as regressors in the CONFLICT equation. 
   20
The variable ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) measures the probability that two 
randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the same language 









=− ∑ , where Pi  is the population share of the ith ethnic group in a 
country (Fearon, 2002). Thus ELF = 0 indicates a totally homogenous society and ELF = 
1 indicates that everyone belongs to a different ethno-linguistic group (totally 
fractionalized society). Our data source for this variable is Alesina et al. (2003). As 
observed by others ELF is expected to have a negative effect on GROWTH emanating 
from ethnic tensions and conflicts. Its effect on ethnic conflicts is generally observed to 
be non-linear (typically an inverted U shape) which we capture by using ELF and ELF
2 
in the CONFLICT equation. The argument here is that the probability of ethnic conflict is 
lower in both more homogenous and more heterogeneous societies than in societies with 
two or three dominant ethnic groups (Ellingsen 2000). 
 
To estimate the parameters of the three equations we use a panel data set of twelve multi-
ethnic developing countries over the time period 1980-2000.
 5 We estimated the first two 
equations with random effects (instead of fixed effects) because the Hausman test favors 
the random effect specification. Since CONFLICT is a binary variable and obtaining 
consistent estimates from a non-linear binary panel model with unobserved effects is not 
straightforward (Hsiao, 2003, Chapter 7) we estimate the third equation as a Logit model 
                                                 
5  The cross section includes Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Our initial focus was Malaysia and Sri Lanka. 
But these two alone did not provide sufficient sample variation to carry out the test. We, therefore, decided 
to settle for a smaller cross section (with a grater focus on Asia) with long time series. In a separate 
qualitative paper we will analyze Malaysian and Sri Lankan cases in detail.   21
without unobserved effects and a linear probability model (LPM) with fixed effects. The 
estimation results are given in Tables 1-3. 
 
 
Table 1: Dependent variable: Economic Growth 









































































































2   0.5818  0.5985 
Adj.R
2   0.5668  0.5765 
DW 1.2113  1.2351 
Note: N=252. Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% 
and 5% levels respectively.                       
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Table 2: Dependent variable: Quality of Governance 








































































2 0.5687  0.5710 
Adj.R
2 0.5491  0.5545 
DW 2.1230  2.3109 
Note: N=252. Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% 
and 5% levels respectively.   
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  Log Likelihood  
= -152.96 
 R
2  = 0.4378 
Adj.R
2   = 0.3948 




2 = 0.4215 
Adj.R
2  = 0.3147 
DW  =1.9076 
Note: N=252. Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5% 
levels respectively.   
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Discussion of results 
The results reported in the three tables are highly affirmative of the basic thesis 
postulated in this exercise. Openness, after controlling for a variety of other determinants, 
exerts a highly statistically significant positive effect on economic growth, improves the 
quality of governance, and reduces the probability of ethnic conflicts. The results are 
quite robust regardless of the measure used for openness. Moreover, although the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of openness under the two measures of OPEN are different 
reflecting the difference in the two measures, the magnitude of the other coefficients 
remain approximately the same under these two measures. This indicates that the two 
measures of openness are roughly orthogonal to the other explanatory variables and as a 
result the effect of openness is measured reasonably accurately regardless of the presence 
or absence of other variables. As discussed earlier, openness is very likely to work as a 
disciplining force on both democratic and authoritarian governments, which is the key to 
bring about policies that are conducive to economic growth, social development, and 
ethnic peace. Taken together, the results in Table 3 highlight how openness, quality of 
governance and economic growth exert a highly significant influence in reducing the 
probability of ethnic conflicts.  
 
It is also worth discussing briefly the role the other variables play in each of our 
regressions. In the growth equation (Table 1), apart from the standard growth 
determinants of capital and labor, democracy shows up with a significant positive effect 
and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) shows up with a significant negative effect as 
expected. Inflation also shows a negative effect on growth. The R
2 in the regression is   25
about 60%, which indicates that our variables do not fully account for the variation in the 
growth rate. This could be a result of left-out variables or incompleteness of the proxies 
used to represent the theoretical counterparts. 
 
The results of the quality of governance equation (Table 2) also confirm the expected 
outcomes. As argued by others, high inflation and large populations in developing 
countries provide a good cover for corruptive activities. It is interesting to note the 
positive effect of democracy in improving the quality of governance or reducing 
corruption.  The R
2 in this equation is also close to 60%. 
 
The equation on ethnic conflicts (Table 3) also shows expected results manifesting with 
statistically significant effects. However, the R
2 of about 40% in the LPM models suggest 
that the prevalence of ethnic conflicts cannot be fully explained by fundamental variables 
alone. As we have argued earlier ethnic conflicts may persist for many reasons including 
vested interests. The results show that high inflation and large population size increase 
the probability of ethnic conflicts. Of particular interest is the non-linear inverted U shape 
effect of democracy and ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the probability of ethnic 
conflict.  The estimates of these two variables across all the columns in Table 3 show that 
the probability of an ethnic conflict reaches the maximum when DEMO and ELF are in 
their half-way mark. In other words, partial democracies with a dominant minority group 
are highly prone to ethnic conflicts. Collier and Rohner (2007) observe that poor 
democratic countries are more prone to conflicts than poor authoritative ones. Although 
authoritative states are likely to achieve ethnic peace they may entail other human right   26
abuses. Nevertheless, open economies even with authoritative states may experience 
faster growth with more responsive governments and may move towards well developed 
democracies faster than poor states with fragile democracies and ethnic conflicts.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Ethnic conflicts have crippled many developing countries. Sustaining ethnic peace is a 
constant challenge that policy makers have to grapple with, even in developed countries. 
Getting good and strong leaders to set every thing right is a cry one could hear around the 
developing world. Since such a dream is far from reality in general, an important question 
to raise is: “is there a mechanism that will help improve the quality of the leaders and 
their governance, provide higher growth, and pave the way for ethnic peace.” The basic 
hypothesis formulated and tested in this exercise is that countries that are open to foreign 
trade and investment are more likely to succeed in improving the quality of governance, 
achieving higher growth, and reducing the probability of ethnic conflicts. On important 
tenant of this formulation is not to treat government as a pure exogenous entity. 
Economic openness tends to act as a disciplining force on governments and thereby 
improve the quality of governance. 
 
The results of the regression analysis strongly favor the above hypothesis.  Obviously a 
determined leadership is required to go against vested interests and open the economy to 
foreign trade and investment and place the private sector in the driving seat of the 
economy. Once set in motion, openness is likely to generate a virtuous feedback loop 
between government policies and the socio-economic environment. As the economic pie   27
gets larger it would be easier to implement other policies that are needed for re-
distribution, social development and ethnic peace.  
 
It should be noted that openness by itself is not sufficient to achieve full ethnic peace. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) summarize a number of other conditions that have been 
discussed in the literature. In particular, a general finding, including ours, that partial and 
fragile democracies are more prone to conflicts than authoritarian states and well-
developed democracies deserves a careful consideration. Observations around the world 
also show that foreign direct investors seek politically stable countries (both democratic 
and authoritarian) for their investments. To work out a system which provides political 
stability and to put in place a mechanism (like openness) that disciplines the government 
is a key priority of the political leadership and responsible citizenry in developing 
countries.
6  
   
                                                 
6  East Asian model of single-party dominated governments that provide political stability and highly  
competitive and open economies that discipline the governments stand out as a good model to emulate in 
the take-off period.    28
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